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NOTE 
Drawing on the Constitution: An Empirical 
Inquiry into the Constitutionality of 
Warrantless and Nonconsensual DWI Blood 
Draws 
State v. McNeely, 358 S.W.3d 65 (Mo. 2012) (per curiam) 
KEVIN STOCKMANN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the early 1990s, approximately 50% of the total number of traffic fa-
talities that occurred in the United States were alcohol-related.1  In response 
to this high percentage, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
of the United States Department of Transportation recommended to Congress 
that all states set .08 blood-alcohol content (BAC) as the threshold for driving 
while intoxicated (DWI) offenses.2  This was after Congress already encour-
aged, and in practical effect mandated,3 states to set their minimum drinking 
age to 21 years old by awarding federal subsidies to states that did so.4  Tak-
ing these actions into account, it is obvious that Congress has expressed a 
  
 * B.A., Benedictine University, 2010; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri 
School of Law, 2013; Associate Managing Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2012-2013.  
I am grateful to Professor Ben Trachtenberg for his guidance throughout the drafting 
process.  I thank my friends and family, especially my grandmother Betty Preis, for 
their never-ending support and enthusiasm for my legal career.  This Note is dedi-
cated to a personal friend and mentor, the late Jerry Wamser, who did everything in 
his power to ensure I was cognizant of my personal strengths and to help me reach my 
utmost potential. 
 1. See Joseph F. Stanton, Note, SJC Steers Off Course: DUI Breath Test Refus-
als Inadmissible, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1169, 1169 (1994) (citing BUREAU OF JUST. 
STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS (1992)).  In 1991, 
approximately fifty percent of all traffic fatalities were alcohol-related.  Id.  In 1991, 
19,900 of the total 41,462 automobile accidents were alcohol-related.  Id. at 1169 n.2. 
 2. Kimberly S. Keller, Sobering up Daubert: Recent Issues Arising in Alcohol-
Related Expert Testimony, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 111, 112 n.2 (2004).  To clarify, a .08 
BAC means that .08% of a person’s blood contains alcohol, not that .8% or 8% of a 
person’s blood contains alcohol.  See infra notes 146-49 and accompanying text. 
 3. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (discussing the practical 
effects this action by Congress had on the states).  
 4. Stanton, supra note 1, at 1169, 1169 n.4. 
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clear intention “to combat this carnage” caused by drunk driving.5  However, 
the Fourth Amendment’s evidentiary limitations inherently conflict with this 
goal.6  While the Fourth Amendment may be in tension with certain aspects 
of law enforcement, this conflict is particularly contentious because Supreme 
Court precedent on this matter has largely left “questions attendant to bodily 
evidence . . . to the states.”7  Accordingly, what evidence may be used to con-
vict an alleged drunk driver for DWI has long been an area of debate. 
A variety of techniques and devices have been made available to law en-
forcement officers to apprehend an alleged intoxicated driver, but whether 
those methods have provided courts with admissible evidence is another 
question.8  Of all these methods,9 the blood draw has been widely heralded as 
the “gold standard of DWI evidence” because it is the least capable of being 
corrupted by errors on the part of the person administering the test.10  This 
widespread “primary authority given blood tests over all other forms of as-
sessing intoxication has made the need for clear constitutional guidance all 
the more important.”11  More specifically, exactly when a law enforcement 
officer can conduct a blood draw on an alleged drunk driver has been a hotly 
contested issue in recent years.12   
In Schmerber v. California,13 the Supreme Court of the United States 
addressed when a police officer may order a blood draw on an alleged intoxi-
cated driver without a warrant or the driver’s consent.14  In that case, the 
Court held that the circumstances presented “special facts” that justified the 
challenged warrantless and nonconsensual blood draw.15  However, the 
Court’s ambiguity as to what constituted “special facts” has generated a great 
deal of confusion.16  Courts have interpreted Schmerber in two distinct ways.  
  
 5. See id. 
 6. See, e.g., Michael A. Correll, Is There a Doctor in the (Station) House?: 
Reassessing the Constitutionality of Compelled DWI Blood Draws Forty-Five Years 
After Schmerber, 113 W. VA. L. REV. 381, 381, 383-84 (2011). 
 7. Id. at 381. 
 8. Stanton, supra note 1, at 1169-72. 
 9. The most common methods of determining one’s BAC are the breathalyzer 
test, the urinalysis test, and the blood draw.  See Correll, supra note 6, at 385-89. 
 10. Id. at 388-89. 
 11. Id. at 383. 
 12. As this Note explains, a police officer can obtain a blood draw on an alleged 
intoxicated driver when the driver consents or the police officer has a warrant.  See 
infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.  Therefore, the issue is when a police offi-
cer may conduct a warrantless and nonconsensual blood draw. 
 13. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
 14. Id. at 766-67. 
 15. Id. at 771. 
 16. See Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Admissibility in Criminal Case of Blood-
Alcohol Test Where Blood Was Taken Despite Defendant’s Objection or Refusal to 
Submit to Test, 14 A.L.R. 4TH 690, § 2(a) (originally published in 1982) [hereinafter 
A.L.R.]. 
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Some have stated that the rapid dissipation of alcohol in an individual’s 
bloodstream without more constitutes a “special fact” justifying such a blood 
draw.17 Others have held that more “special facts” are required for such a 
blood draw to be constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.18   
In State v. McNeely,19 the Supreme Court of Missouri took its turn at in-
terpreting Schmerber and stated that the rapid dissipation of alcohol in an 
individual’s bloodstream by itself is not a “special fact” justifying a warran-
tless and nonconsensual blood draw on an alleged drunk driver.20  Like many 
other courts, the Supreme Court of Missouri largely relied on interpreting the 
text of Schmerber to justify its decision.  
This Note assesses how courts have interpreted the text of Schmerber to 
justify conclusions while determining whether policy justifications support 
any particular interpretation.21  It then considers whether empirical data may 
favor one interpretation of Schmerber by examining the dissipation rate of 
alcohol from an individual’s bloodstream, the average time it takes a law 
enforcement officer to obtain a warrant for a blood draw on an alleged intoxi-
cated driver, and the reliability of retrograde extrapolation.22  This Note con-
firms that neither the text of Schmerber nor the policy underlying its holding 
clearly favors a particular interpretation on the constitutionality of warrantless 
and nonconsensual blood draws on an alleged drunk driver.23  It then con-
cludes that empirical data supports the position that the rapid dissipation of an 
individual’s BAC by itself is a “special fact” justifying a warrantless and 
nonconsensual blood draw.24 
  
 17. See, e.g., State v. Netland, 762 N.W.2d 202, 214 (Minn. 2009); State v. Ma-
chuca, 227 P.3d 729, 736 (Or. 2010) (en banc); State v. Bohling, 494 N.W.2d 399, 
406 (Wis. 1993). 
 18. See, e.g., United States v. Chapel, 55 F.3d 1416, 1418-20 (9th Cir. 1995); 
State v. Johnson, 744 N.W.2d 340, 344-45 (Iowa 2008); State v. Rodriguez, 156 P.3d 
771, 780-82 (Utah 2007). 
 19. 358 S.W.3d 65 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. granted, Missouri v. 
McNeely, No. 11-1425, 2012 WL 1899415 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2012). 
 20. Id. at 67. 
 21. See infra Part V.A. 
 22. See infra Part V.B.4.  Retrograde extrapolation is the method used to assess 
one’s BAC based on blood tests conducted hours after alcohol has dissipated, but not 
completely, from the bloodstream.  See Lawrence E. Wines, The Law and Science of 
Retrograde Extrapolation, in UNDERSTANDING DUI SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: LEADING 
LAWYERS ON UNDERSTANDING NEW FORENSIC SCIENCE, CHALLENGING TESTING 
PROCEDURES AND RESULTS, AND CONSULTING EXPERTS FOR DEFENSE ARGUMENTS 
(2010 ed.), available at 2010 WL 1976216, at *1. 
 23. See infra Part V.A. 
 24. See infra Part V.B.4.  
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II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
Tyler McNeely was driving above the posted speed limit along a Mis-
souri state highway in Cape Girardeau during the early morning hours of 
October 3, 2010.25  Corporal Mark Winder, a Missouri state highway patrol-
man, observed McNeely speeding and crossing the center line of the highway 
three times.26  Corporal Winder pulled McNeely over at 2:08 a.m.27   
Corporal Winder initially planned on conducting a routine traffic stop 
for speeding.28  However, Corporal Winder approached McNeely’s truck and 
observed that McNeely’s eyes were glassy and bloodshot, his breath smelt of 
alcohol, and his speech was slurred.29  Corporal Winder’s routine traffic stop 
then became a DWI investigation.30 
To help determine McNeely’s BAC, Corporal Winder took several 
steps.31  First, he administered four different field sobriety tests.32  McNeely 
performed very poorly on each test.33  Subsequently, Corporal Winder asked 
McNeely to give a breath sample into a portable breathalyzer to more pre-
cisely determine McNeely’s BAC.34  However, McNeely repeatedly refused 
consent.35  Corporal Winder then arrested McNeely and began to transport 
him to the Cape Girardeau County Jail to administer a breath test.36  McNeely 
refused to do a breath test there as well.37  Corporal Winder then transported 
McNeely to the Saint Francis Medical Center to obtain a blood sample to 
more precisely determine McNeely’s BAC.38  Although McNeely also re-
fused consent to a blood sample and Corporal Winder did not obtain a war-
rant to take one, a blood sample was taken.39  
The State of Missouri charged McNeely with DWI in the Circuit Court 
of Cape Girardeau County, Missouri.40  McNeely filed a motion to suppress 
  
 25. State v. McNeely, No. ED 96402, 2011 WL 2455571, *1 (Mo. App. E.D. 
June 21, 2011), transferred to 358 S.W.3d 65 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. 
granted, Missouri v. McNeely, No. 11-1425, 2012 WL 1899415 (U.S. Sept. 25, 
2012). 
 26. Id. 
 27. McNeely, 358 S.W.3d at 67. 
 28. See id. 
 29. Id. at 67-68. 
 30. Id. at 68. 
 31. See McNeely, 2011 WL 2455571, at *1. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
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the blood sample evidence, arguing that the blood sample was taken in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment without a warrant or consent.41  The circuit 
court granted McNeely’s motion.42  In its opinion, the court stated that the 
Fourth Amendment requires “exigent circumstances” to draw blood from an 
alleged drunk driver without a warrant or consent.43  Additionally, the court 
noted that the only time such a blood draw has been qualified by the Supreme 
Court of the United States as an “exigent circumstance” was when there were 
“special facts” of a delay that would threaten the destruction of evidence, and 
no time to secure a warrant.44  Because there was no evidence of a substantial 
delay between the traffic stop and the blood draw, the circuit court held that 
there was no evidence of any “special facts” to permit a warrantless and non-
consensual blood draw.45  The State brought an interlocutory appeal.46 
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of Missouri, 
the State argued that the Supreme Court of the United States established that 
the rapid dissipation of alcohol in an individual’s bloodstream is by itself a 
“special fact” constituting an “exigent circumstance” justifying a warrantless 
and nonconsensual blood draw on an alleged intoxicated driver.47  McNeely, 
on the other hand, maintained that more “special facts” are required.48  The 
appellate court agreed with the State.49  The court noted that the rapid dissipa-
tion of alcohol in an individual’s blood is sufficient without more to qualify 
as a “special fact” permitting a warrantless and nonconsensual blood draw on 
an alleged drunk driver.50  Therefore, the court stated that this “special fact” 
by itself creates an “exigent circumstance” justifying such a blood draw.51  
The appellate court stated it would reverse the circuit court, yet it transferred 
the case to the Supreme Court of Missouri in light of the vagueness of Mis-
souri law on this topic and the public interest in the issues involved.52 
  
 41. See id.  McNeely was charged for violating MO. REV. STAT. § 577.010 
(2000).  Id.  
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)). 
 44. Id. (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757). 
 45. See id.  
 46. Id. 
 47. State v. McNeely, 358 S.W.3d 65, 70 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam), 
cert. granted, Missouri v. McNeely, No. 11-1425, 2012 WL 1899415 (U.S. Sept. 25, 
2012).  The “exigent circumstances” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement has been explicitly adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States, 
and it is explained more thoroughly later in this note.  See Payton v. New York, 445 
U.S. 573 (1980); see also infra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 48. See McNeely, 2011 WL 2455571, at *1. 
 49. Id. at *7.  Because the court deferred to the Supreme Court of Missouri in 
deciding this case, its opinion was not legally binding.  Id.   
 50. Id. at *4. 
 51. Id.    
 52. Id. at *7. 
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On transfer, the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the decision of the 
circuit court.53  Though the parties maintained the same positions they had in 
the appellate court, the Supreme Court of Missouri denied the State’s argu-
ments and affirmed the grant of McNeely’s motion.54  The court noted that 
the Supreme Court of the United States explicitly stated that a court should 
not hold that the natural dissipation of blood-alcohol per se constitutes a 
“special fact” that constitutes an “exigent circumstance.”55  Therefore, the 
Supreme Court of Missouri held that when a warrantless and nonconsensual 
blood draw has been taken from an alleged intoxicated driver, it qualifies as 
an “exigent circumstance” only if “special facts” beyond the rapid dissipation 
of alcohol in an individual’s bloodstream exist to justify the act.56 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Fourth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation . . . .”57  
This clause fails to specify any standards for determining what is an unrea-
sonable, and thus an unconstitutional, search or seizure.58  Consequently, 
courts have faced, and continue to face, the task of addressing the hot-button 
issue of whether a police officer violates the Fourth Amendment by taking a 
warrantless and nonconsensual blood sample from an alleged intoxicated 
driver.59  This Part first lays out the legal standards that the Supreme Court of 
  
 53. State v. McNeely, 358 S.W.3d 65, 67 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam), 
cert. granted, Missouri v. McNeely, No. 11-1425, 2012 WL 1899415 (U.S. Sept. 25, 
2012).  This was an affirmation of the order granting of McNeely’s motion to sup-
press the evidence, but McNeely still had to stand trial for DWI.  Id. at 75. 
 54. Id. at 67. 
 55. Id. at 74 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966)).  The 
Supreme Court of Missouri used this language of the Supreme Court of the United 
States as a major justification for not adopting such an approach.  See id.   
 56. Id. The court stated the additional “special fact” required is that an officer 
must “reasonably believe” that he is “confronted with an emergency where the delay 
in obtaining a warrant would threaten the destruction of evidence.”  Id.  (citing 
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770).  “The question of whether an emergency exists suffi-
cient to trigger the exigent circumstances exception . . . must be determined on a case-
by-case basis.”  Id. 
 57. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 58. See id. 
 59. Compare State v. Netland, 762 N.W.2d 202 (Minn. 2009) (examining the 
validity of a state statute that authorized criminal sanctions for refusal to take a 
chemical case), State v. Machuca, 227 P.3d 729 (Or. 2010) (en banc) (“[T]he evanes-
cent nature of a suspect’s blood alcohol content is an exigent circumstance that will 
ordinarily permit a warrantless blood draw[.]”), and State v. Bohling, 494 N.W.2d 
399 (Wis. 1993) (“[T]he dissipation of alcohol from a person’s blood stream consti-
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the United States has set forth in interpreting the Fourth Amendment to de-
termine this issue.  This Part then analyzes how other courts have interpreted 
the Court’s precedent on this matter.  Finally, it concludes with a discussion 
of Missouri’s stance on the subject. 
A.  Supreme Court of the United States Precedent on Warrantless, 
Non-Consensual Blood Draws 
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures of a person or a person’s property.60  There are generally two require-
ments for a search of a person or a person’s property to be reasonable: prob-
able cause and a warrant.61     
Probable cause exists if there is a “fair probability” that evidence of a 
crime, or something else subject to lawful seizure, will be found in a particu-
lar place.62  This is judged on a totality of circumstances approach in which 
an individual must make the determination given all the circumstances.63  
Moreover, this “is a fluid concept” as it “turn[s] on the assessment of prob-
abilities in particular factual contexts” that are “not readily . . . reduced to a 
neat set of legal rules.”64 
As for the warrant requirement, a police officer is generally required to 
obtain prior approval of a search by a judge or magistrate as “searches con-
ducted outside the judicial process . . . are per se unreasonable.”65  However, 
this rule is not absolute as it is subject to a “few specifically established and 
well-delineated exceptions.”66  Consent to a search is an exception to the war-
rant requirement and makes a warrantless search permissible.67  A search 
  
tutes a sufficient exigency to justify a warrantless blood draw.”), with United States v. 
Chapel, 55 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1995) (listing additional factors that must be present in 
order for a law enforcement officer to lawfully take a blood sample without a warrant 
or consent), State v. Johnson, 744 N.W.2d 340 (Iowa 2008) (“The evanescence of 
blood-alcohol was never special enough to create an exigent circumstance by itself.” 
(quoting State v. Rodriguez, 156 P.3d 771 (Utah 2007)) (internal quotations omitted)), 
and Rodriguez, 156 P.3d at 772 (finding the “dissipation of alcohol in the blood, 
without more” did not create “an exigent circumstance under the Fourth Amend-
ment”).  
 60. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-
53 (1967). 
 61. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.  
 62. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. at 232.  A more thorough explanation of “probable cause,” as well as the 
exceptions to this requirement, is not necessary because this note focuses on the 
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. 
 65. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (emphasis added). 
 66. Id.  
 67. See Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946). 
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conducted incident to a lawful arrest is another exception, and allows a police 
officer making a lawful arrest to conduct a warrantless search on “the arres-
tee’s person” and the area “within his immediate control” to prevent the con-
cealment or destruction of evidence.68  
It was not until 1966 in Schmerber v. California that the Supreme Court 
of the United States directly addressed whether a police officer’s warrantless 
and nonconsensual blood draw on an alleged drunk driver violated the Fourth 
Amendment.69  In Schmerber, the Court first noted that ordinarily a police 
officer must obtain a warrant to obtain a blood sample from an alleged intoxi-
cated driver.70  However, the Court recognized that such a blood draw may be 
justified under the search incident to a lawful arrest exception in certain situa-
tions.71  The Court concluded that these circumstances presented “special 
facts” that invoked the search incident to a lawful arrest exception to the war-
rant requirement, thus no warrant was required.72  The “special facts” pre-
sented were that an individual’s BAC diminishes rapidly shortly after the 
individual stops drinking, and an unusual delay threatens the destruction of 
the chemical evidence.73  However, the Court did not explicitly state whether 
the dissipation of alcohol in an individual’s bloodstream by itself constitutes a 
“special fact” that invokes the search incident to a lawful arrest exception, or 
whether more justifiable circumstances are needed to qualify as “special 
facts.”74  The Court recognized that blood draws are highly evanescent evi-
dence that must be obtained quickly as “the percentage of alcohol in the 
blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops.”75  However, it also 
  
 68. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338-39 (2009); Chimel v. California, 395 
U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).  
 69. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
 70. Id. at 770 (“[W]arrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings, and 
absent an emergency, no less could be required where intrusions into the human body 
are concerned.”).  The Court also noted that probable cause existed when, upon mak-
ing contact with the accused, the police officer discovered that the accused had sev-
eral “symptoms of drunkenness.”  Id. at 768-69.  The “symptoms of drunkenness” 
that justified probable cause were that the defendant’s breath smelt like liquor, and his 
eyes were glassy and bloodshot.  Id.  Again, more in-depth analysis of probable cause 
is unnecessary as McNeely and this note focuses on the warrant requirement, and the 
facts of McNeely make it clear Corporal Winder had similar probable cause anyway.  
See State v. McNeely, 358 S.W.3d 65, 67-68 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam) (de-
scribing how Corporal Winder observed that McNeely’s eyes were glassy and blood-
shot, his breath smelt of alcohol, and his speech was slurred), cert. granted, Missouri 
v. McNeely, No. 11-1425, 2012 WL 1899415 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2012). 
 71. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771. 
 72. Id. at 770-71 (“Particularly in a case such as this . . . we conclude that the 
attempt to secure evidence of blood-alcohol content in this case was an appropriate 
incident to petitioner’s arrest.”).   
 73. See id.   
 74. See id. 
 75. Id. at 770. 
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emphasized that “this judgment [was reached] only on the facts of the present 
record,” and simply because “the Constitution does not forbid the States mi-
nor intrusions into an individual’s body under stringently limited conditions” 
does not “indicate[] that [the Constitution] permits . . . intrusions under other 
conditions.”76   
Since Schmerber, the Court has explicitly adopted another exception to 
the warrant requirement known as the “exigent circumstances” exception.77  
This exception states that a police officer is permitted to perform a warran-
tless search of a person or a person’s property if “exigent circumstances” 
justify the action.78  To evaluate whether such circumstances exist, the Court 
has laid out a two-step process.79  First, a court must identify all of the rele-
vant facts known to the officer at the time of the search.80  Second, the court 
must use an objective standard of reasonableness to determine if those facts 
would give rise to a reasonable suspicion justifying the search.81  The Court 
has also held that the “exigent circumstances” exception shall not apply when 
a police officer has “created” or “manufactured” the need for a search.82 
The Court in Schmerber explicitly stated that the warrantless and non-
consensual blood draw on the alleged drunk driver under review was justified 
under the search incident to a lawful arrest exception.83  Since the Court 
adopted the “exigent circumstances” exception, however, the Court has ex-
plicitly stated that the Schmerber analysis was an early application of this 
later-established exception.84  Nonetheless, the vagueness of Schmerber 
leaves much doubt as to when a warrantless and nonconsensual blood draw 
on an alleged drunk driver violates the Fourth Amendment’s warrant re-
quirement.   
  
 76. Id. at 772. 
 77. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587-88 (1980). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996). 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. 
 82. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1857-58 (2011) (quoting United States v. 
Chambers, 395 F.3d 563, 566 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
United States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578, 590 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc)).  A police officer 
“creates” or “manufactures” the need for a search when the officer gains entry “by 
means of an actual or threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment.”  Id. at 1862.  A 
police officer does not “create” or “manufacture” the need for a search when the po-
lice officer’s conduct preceding the exigency is “reasonable in the same sense.”  Id. at 
1858. 
 83. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966) (“Particularly in a case 
such as this . . . we conclude that the attempt to secure evidence of blood-alcohol 
content in this case was an appropriate incident to petitioner’s arrest.”). 
 84. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985) (“[Schmerber] fell within the 
exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement”). 
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B.  Other Courts’ Interpretations of Schmerber 
Other courts have been more than inconsistent in their interpretations of 
Schmerber, and state courts of last resort have reached opposing conclusions 
on what constitutes “special facts” that permit a warrantless and nonconsen-
sual blood draw.85  This divergence can be attributed to the Supreme Court’s 
vague yet strong emphasis on the importance of stopping the destruction of 
evidence via the rapid dissipation of an individual’s BAC in alcohol-related 
cases.86  Regardless, jurisdictions have interpreted Schmerber in one of two 
ways: that the rapid dissipation of alcohol in an individual’s bloodstream by 
itself constitutes a sufficient exigency to justify a warrantless and nonconsen-
sual blood draw from an alleged intoxicated driver, or that more “special 
facts” are required to justify such action.87 
A number of jurisdictions have concluded that the rapid dissipation of 
alcohol in a person’s bloodstream by itself creates a “special fact” invoking 
the “exigent circumstances” exception permitting a warrantless and noncon-
sensual blood draw.88  Some of these courts have explicitly stated that 
Schmerber held that this “special fact” creates a “single-factor exigent cir-
cumstance,” which permits such a blood draw.89  Following the same reason-
ing, some state legislatures have amended their constitutions or enacted “im-
plied consent” statutes to state that a driver consents to such a blood draw by 
applying for a license to drive.90  Other courts have concluded that Schmerber 
stands for the proposition that this “special fact” creates an “exigent circum-
stance” that “ordinarily permit[s] a . . . blood draw of [this] kind,”91 yet there 
must be a “clear indication” before the blood draw that the evidence obtained 
“will produce evidence of intoxication.”92  These courts consider the rapid 
  
 85. See infra notes 88-98 and accompanying text. 
 86. See State v. Bohling, 494 N.W.2d 399, 402 (Wis. 1993). 
 87. Id.  The latter jurisdictions have further diverged as to what facts are “spe-
cial” enough to qualify as an “exigent circumstance” and permit a warrantless and 
nonconsensual blood draw on an alleged intoxicated driver.  See infra notes 95-98 and 
accompanying text. 
 88. See, e.g., State v. Netland, 762 N.W.2d 202, 212 (Minn. 2009) (applying 
prior blood draw logic to a case in which a breathalyzer test was at issue); State v. 
Shriner, 751 N.W.2d 538, 549-50 (Minn. 2008); State v. Machuca, 227 P.3d 729, 736 
(Or. 2010); Bohling, 494 N.W.2d at 400.  
 89. See, e.g., Shriner, 751 N.W.2d at 548.  These courts hold that “whether exi-
gent circumstances exist is an objective determination, and the [police] officer’s sub-
jective state of mind is irrelevant.”  Id. at 542.  It follows that a warrantless and non-
consensual blood draw on an alleged drunk driver would always be permitted, so long 
as probable cause is present.  See id.   
 90. A.L.R., supra note 16, § 2(a); see TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN.  § 724.011 
(West, Westlaw through Reg. Sess. of 82nd Legis.). 
 91. Machuca, 227 P.3d at 736. 
 92. Bohling, 494 N.W.2d at 406. 
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dissipation of an individual’s BAC by itself a “special fact” presenting an 
“exigent circumstance,” and the “clear indication” is required to show that the 
driver was intoxicated, thus the rapid dissipation of the driver’s BAC is 
threatening the destruction of BAC evidence.93  Though these approaches 
differ slightly, these jurisdictions hold that the rapid dissipation of alcohol in 
an individual’s bloodstream by itself constitutes a “special fact” invoking the 
“exigent circumstances” exception. 
Concurrently, a number of other jurisdictions have adopted the opposite 
view that Schmerber requires more “special facts” beyond the rapid dissipa-
tion of an individual’s BAC for a warrantless and nonconsensual blood draw 
to qualify as an “exigent circumstance.”94  However, these jurisdictions have 
diverged as to what facts beyond the dissipation of alcohol are “special” 
enough to qualify as an “exigent circumstance.”95  To start, some courts have 
held that the police officer must reasonably believe that an emergency ex-
ists.”96  Other courts have decided the “totality of the circumstances” must 
show that the “officer was confronted with an emergency.”97  Finally, some 
state legislatures have amended their constitutions or enacted statutes to ex-
plicitly set forth the standards that must be met in order to permit such a 
blood draw.98  Notwithstanding these different standards as to what additional 
“special facts” are required, these jurisdictions clearly conclude that Schmer-
ber requires more “special facts” beyond the rapid dissipation of an individ-
  
 93. See, e.g., id. at 402, 406.  To clarify, these courts require a “clear indication” 
that the driver was drunk, such as a smell of alcohol on the driver’s breath, which in 
turn makes it clear that the rapid dissipation of the driver’s BAC is threatening the 
destruction of the evidence.  See id. at 406.  This “special fact” by itself would then 
justify a warrantless and nonconsensual blood draw.  Id.  This must be distinguished 
from states that require more “special facts” causing a delay in the ability of the police 
officer to obtain a warrant, like the driver being in a car accident or an unreasonably 
long time to obtain a warrant. 
 94. See e.g., United States v. Chapel, 55 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1995); State v. 
Johnson, 744 N.W.2d 340 (Iowa 2008); State v. Rodriguez, 156 P.3d 771 (Utah 
2007).  
 95. See Chapel, 55 F.3d at 1419 (“The officer must still reasonably believe that 
an emergency exists in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant would threaten 
the loss or destruction of evidence.  The procedures used to extract the sample must 
still be reasonably and in accordance with accepted medical practices.”); Johnson, 
744 N.W. at 342 (outlining three statutory requirements for implied consent); Rodri-
guez, 156 P.3d at 780 (“Whether exigent circumstances are present to justify a war-
rantless intrusion depends on ‘all of the circumstances surrounding the search or sei-
zure and the nature of the of the search or seizure itself’” (quoting United States v. 
Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985))).  
 96. Chapel, 55 F.3d at 1419. 
 97. Rodriguez, 156 P.3d at 773.  
 98. See Johnson, 744 N.W.2d at 341 (citing IOWA CODE ANN. § 321J.6 (West, 
Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.)). 
11
Stockmann: Stockmann: Drawing on the Constitution
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
File: StockmannPaginated.docx Created on:  10/21/13 10:30 PM Last Printed: 11/3/13 11:12 PM 
362 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78 
 
ual’s BAC for a warrantless and nonconsensual blood draw on an alleged 
drunk driver to qualify as an “exigent circumstance.” 
C.  Missouri’s Interpretation of Schmerber 
Although the Supreme Court of Missouri did not address the Schmerber 
decision until McNeely, the Court of Appeals for the Western District of Mis-
souri touched on the issue two decades earlier in State v. LeRette.99  In LeR-
ette, the appellate court explicitly stated that a warrantless and nonconsensual 
blood draw on an alleged drunk driver falls under the “exigent circum-
stances” exception.100  Although the appellate court eventually concluded that 
the “exigent circumstances” exception permitted the blood draw in that case, 
it never addressed what the “special facts” were that justified its conclu-
sion.101  In other words, the appellate court never decided whether or not the 
rapid dissipation of an individual’s BAC by itself creates a “special fact” 
invoking the “exigent circumstances” exception permitting a warrantless and 
nonconsensual blood draw on an alleged drunk driver.102 
While Missouri case law has only skimmed the surface of this issue, 
Missouri statutory law has been more on point with the evolution of Missouri 
Revised Statutes section 577.041.1.103  Before 2010, section 577.041.1 stated 
that if an alleged intoxicated driver refused a blood draw, then evidence of the 
driver’s refusal was admissible in court but “none shall be given.”104  If a 
police officer ordered such a blood draw anyway, ordinarily the blood test 
results were not admissible in court.105  The blood test results were admissible 
in court if the blood test was taken pursuant to a warrant, or the “exigent cir-
cumstances” exception applied.106  The current version of section 577.041.1 
provides that if an alleged intoxicated driver refuses a blood draw, then evi-
dence of the driver’s refusal is admissible in court.107  However, this version 
  
 99. 858 S.W.2d 816 (Mo. App. W.D. 1993).   
 100. Id. at 819. 
 101. Id. (“[T]he exigent circumstances exception [was] established”). 
 102. See id. 
 103. MO. REV. STAT. § 577.041.1 (Supp. 2011) (amending MO. REV. STAT. § 
577.041.1 (2000)). 
 104. MO. REV. STAT. § 577.041.1 (2000) (amended 2010).  The phrase “none shall 
be given” was interpreted to mean that no blood test could be administered in such a 
situation.   
 105. See State v. Ikerman, 698 S.W.2d 902, 905-06 (Mo. App. E.D. 1985) (citing 
MO. REV. STAT. § 577.041.1 (1984) (amended 2010)), abrogated by State v. 
McNeely, 358 S.W.3d 65 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. granted, Missouri 
v. McNeely, No. 11-1425, 2012 WL 1899415 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2012)). 
 106. State v. Smith, 134 S.W.3d 35, 37-38 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003) (citing MO. REV. 
STAT. § 577.041.1 (1984) (amended 2000)). 
 107. MO. REV. STAT. § 577.041.1 (Supp. 2011) (amending MO. REV. STAT. § 
577.041.1 (2000)). 
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does not contain the phrase “none shall be given.”108  Prosecuting attorneys 
throughout Missouri have asserted that the deletion of this phrase means that 
the Missouri General Assembly has concluded that Schmerber holds that the 
rapid dissipation of an individual’s BAC by itself constitutes a “special fact” 
invoking the “exigent circumstances” exception permitting a warrantless and 
nonconsensual blood draw on an alleged drunk driver.109  In McNeely, how-
ever, the Supreme Court of Missouri rejected this proposition.110 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
In McNeely, the Supreme Court of Missouri determined under what cir-
cumstances a warrantless and nonconsensual blood draw on an alleged in-
toxicated driver is constitutional within the Fourth Amendment.111  In an-
swering this question, the court, in a per curiam opinion,112 divided its analy-
sis into three steps.113 
The court first addressed what the Supreme Court of the United States 
required in Schmerber.114  The court noted that Schmerber “rejected a per se 
exigency and explicitly warned against such expansive interpretations.”115  
The Supreme Court of Missouri observed that Schmerber presented multiple 
“special facts” that justified the warrantless and nonconsensual blood draw in 
that particular instance.116  Therefore, the court in McNeely held that because 
Schmerber rejected a per se exception to the warrant requirement, and be-
cause multiple “special facts” were what qualified that blood draw as consti-
tutional, Schmerber held that a warrantless and nonconsensual blood draw on 
an alleged drunk driver is constitutional only when more “special facts” are 
present.117   
  
 108. Id. 
 109. See McNeely, 358 S.W.3d at 68 n.2. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 67.  The Court based its decision on federal law, not Missouri law.  See 
id. 
 112. Id.  A per curiam opinion is an opinion that is authored not by one judge, but 
by the court as a whole.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 372 (9th ed. 2009).  Judge 
Draper did not participate in the decision, and the rest of the judges joined the opin-
ion.  McNeely, 358 S.W.3d 65. 
 113. McNeely, 358 S.W.3d at 69-74. 
 114. Id. at 69. 
 115. Id. at 74. 
 116. Id. at 69-70.  The “special facts” were the rapid dissipation of alcohol in a 
person’s bloodstream, and a time delay that sufficiently threatened the destruction of 
the evidence.  Id.  The time delay was created by the investigation of the scene of the 
accident, and the large amount of time needed to transport the driver to the hospital 
for injuries caused by the collision.  Id.  The injuries the driver sustained were the 
result of him driving his car into a tree.  See id. at 69.  
 117. Id. at 70. 
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The court next considered whether other jurisdictions supported its in-
terpretation of Schmerber.118  The court found that at least three other juris-
dictions supported its finding that the dissipation of alcohol in an alleged 
drunk driver’s bloodstream is not by itself a “special fact” to qualify as an 
“exigent circumstance.”119  Moreover, the court stated that lower courts in 
Missouri have also interpreted Schmerber to mean more “special facts” are 
necessary to qualify as an “exigent circumstance.”120  The court found this 
authority instructive in supporting its interpretation of Schmerber.121 
Finally, the court addressed whether other jurisdictions do not support 
its interpretation of Schmerber.122  The court first stated that three jurisdic-
tions have adopted the rationale that the rapid dissipation of alcohol without 
more constitutes a “special fact” invoking the “exigent circumstances” excep-
tion.123  However, the court noted that Schmerber explicitly refused to hold 
that the rapid dissipation of alcohol alone constitutes a “special fact,” and it 
explicitly warned against such an expansive interpretation.124  With this in 
mind, the court disagreed with these jurisdictions, finding the reasoning un-
persuasive.125 
The Supreme Court of Missouri noted that although Schmerber couched 
its terms in the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement, 
it has since been read, and should be read, as an early application of the “exi-
  
 118. Id. at 69-73. 
 119. Id. at 70-71.  The court first cited to a Supreme Court of Utah case with a 
similar interpretation of Schmerber.  Id. at 70 (citing State v. Rodriguez, 156 P.3d 771 
(Utah 2007)).  In continuing its analysis, the court also cited to a case from the Su-
preme Court of Iowa that interpreted a state statute that required both probable cause 
and “special facts” to be present in such a situation.  Id. at 71 (discussing State v. 
Johnson, 744 N.W.2d 340 (Iowa 2008)).  Finally, the court noted that the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit interpreted Schmerber similarly.  Id. at 
71-72 (citing United States v. Chapel, 55 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1995)).  
 120. Id. at 72-73.  The court mainly discussed a Court of Appeals for the Western 
District of Missouri case that held that “exigent circumstances” were present, but did 
not explicitly address what those facts were.  Id. (citing State v. LeRette, 858 S.W.2d 
816 (Mo. App. W.D. 1993), abrogated by McNeely, 358 S.W.3d 65).  The Supreme 
Court of Missouri held that the appellate court inherently found that there were “spe-
cial facts” beyond the dissipation of alcohol that qualified as an “exigent circum-
stance.”  Id. 
 121. Id. at 69-73. 
 122. Id. at 73-74. 
 123. Id. at 73.  The court first discussed a Supreme Court of Wisconsin case that 
adopted such a per se rule.  Id. (citing State v. Bohling, 494 N.W.2d 399 (Wis. 
1993)).  Then, the court stated the Supreme Court of Oregon also adopted that rule.  
Id. (citing State v. Machuca, 227 P.3d 729 (Or. 2010) (en banc)).  Finally, the court 
noted that the Supreme Court of Minnesota also adopted the same rule.  Id. at 73-74 
(citing State v. Netland, 762 N.W.2d 202 (Minn. 2009)).   
 124. Id. at 74. 
 125. Id. 
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gent circumstances” exception.126  It noted that whether there are sufficient 
“special facts” invoking the “exigent circumstances” exception should be 
determined on a case-by-case basis.127  The court held that when a warran-
tless and nonconsensual blood draw has been taken on an alleged intoxicated 
driver, it qualifies as an “exigent circumstance” only if more “special facts” 
exist beyond the rapid dissipation of an individual’s BAC to justify the 
search.128 
V.  COMMENT 
The Supreme Court of the United States has explicitly recognized the 
Fourth Amendment’s inherent competing policy concerns.  On the one hand, 
the Fourth Amendment seeks to protect “[t]he security of one’s privacy 
against arbitrary intrusion by the police.”129  On the other hand, there should 
be equal emphasis on preserving evidence to protect society’s interest in 
eliminating criminal activity.130  These seemingly irreconcilable goals are 
perhaps one of the reasons why the Court granted certiorari in Schmerber, so 
that it could address whether a warrantless and nonconsensual blood draw on 
an alleged intoxicated driver offends the Fourth Amendment. 
As mentioned above, the Court in Schmerber ambiguously held that the 
“special facts” of the case justified a warrantless and nonconsensual blood 
draw on an alleged drunk driver.131  Much has been written on how Schmer-
ber’s vagueness “ultimately produced a split in Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence” in this area.132  However, significantly less commentary has focused 
on how quantitative data may be used to justify one interpretation of Schmer-
ber over another.  Accordingly, this Part conducts a two-part analysis.  First, 
it explains how lower courts have traditionally justified their interpretations 
of Schmerber, and whether one interpretation is firmly supported by the text 
of Schmerber.  Second, it focuses on how empirical data may justify one in-
terpretation of Schmerber over the other.  More specifically, this Part evalu-
ates the dissipation rate of an individual’s BAC, the average time it takes a 
  
 126. Id. at 72 n.5. 
 127. Id. at 74. 
 128. Id.  
 129. Wolf v. People, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643 (1961). 
 130. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (“The interests in 
human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such 
intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained. In the absence 
of a clear indication that in fact such evidence will be found, these fundamental hu-
man interests require law officers to suffer the risk that such evidence may disappear 
unless there is an immediate search.”); Correll, supra note 6, at 409-10. 
 131. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71. 
 132. See, e.g., Correll, supra note 6, at 397-98, 403. 
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police officer to obtain a warrant for a blood draw on an alleged drunk driver, 
and the accuracy of retrograde extrapolation.133 
A.  Interpreting Schmerber with Text and Policy 
While Schmerber’s holding clearly sets precedent for similar claims, it 
left unanswered whether the Court intended for the dissipation of an individ-
ual’s BAC without more to be considered a “special fact,” or if more exigen-
cies are required.134  In answering this question, courts have justified their 
holdings on the text of Schmerber and various policy considerations.135  With 
courts reaching opposite answers to this question, the question becomes obvi-
ous: which interpretation is correct?   
A number of courts have concluded that Schmerber allows for the dissi-
pation of an individual’s BAC by itself to constitute a “special fact” invoking 
the “exigent circumstances” exception.136  These courts have relied on the 
text of Schmerber that emphasizes how blood draws are highly evanescent 
evidence that must be obtained quickly as “the percentage of alcohol in the 
blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops.”137  These courts con-
clude that their “interpretation of Schmerber makes sense from a policy 
standpoint” because states’ interests in enforcing drunk driving laws “[are] 
vital whereas the resulting intrusion on individual privacy [from a blood 
draw] is minimal.”138   
The Supreme Court of Missouri and a number of other courts have 
found that Schmerber requires more “special facts” beyond the dissipation of 
alcohol from an individual’s bloodstream to qualify as an “exigent circum-
stance.”139  In justifying their decisions, these courts have pointed to the text 
of Schmerber that states that the “judgment [was reached] only on the facts of 
the present record,” and the judgment was permitted “under stringently lim-
  
 133. Retrograde extrapolation is the method used to assess one’s BAC based on 
blood tests conducted hours after alcohol has dissipated, but not completely, from the 
bloodstream.  See Wines, supra note 22, at *1. 
 134. State v. Bohling, 494 N.W.2d 399, 402 (Wis. 1993). 
 135. See infra notes 137-42 and accompanying text. 
 136. See, e.g., State v. Netland, 762 N.W.2d 202, 212 (Minn. 2009); State v. 
Shriner, 751 N.W.2d 538, 549 (Minn. 2008); State v. Machuca, 227 P.3d 729, 736 
(Or. 2010) (en banc); Bohling, 494 N.W.2d at 402. 
 137. Machuca, 227 P.3d at 652-53 (quoting State v. Heintz, 594 P.2d 385, 390 
(Or. 1979) (en banc)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 138. Bohling, 494 N.W.2d at 405. 
 139. See, e.g., United States v. Chapel, 55 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1995); State v. 
Johnson, 744 N.W.2d 340 (Iowa 2008); State v. McNeely, 358 S.W.3d 65 (Mo. 2012) 
(en banc) (per curiam), cert. granted, Missouri v. McNeely, No. 11-1425, 2012 WL 
1899415 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2012); State v. Rodriguez, 156 P.3d 771 (Utah 2007). 
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ited conditions.”140  These courts have generally stated that requiring more of 
a case-by-case analysis of the circumstances at hand “is the result of balanc-
ing the state’s interest in collecting evidence against the defendant’s interests 
in privacy and bodily integrity.”141  
The two divergent interpretations of Schmerber both appear reasonable 
under a textual analysis and by reference to underlying policy concerns.  Any 
further attempt to use these methods to determine which interpretation of 
Schmerber is correct is therefore seemingly futile.  So, how can a court de-
cide which interpretation of Schmerber best accords with Fourth Amendment 
decisions and sound public policy?  With the advancements in modern tech-
nology, a plausible alternative is to further validate the opinion with an em-
pirical analysis. 
B.  Empirically Justifying an Interpretation of Schmerber   
With the advances of forensic science and medical technology in the 
years since Schmerber, the “human body has become an increasingly impor-
tant source of valuable, necessary, and expected evidence.”142  More specifi-
cally, “[n]owhere has this development been more prolific . . . than the area of 
DWI blood draws for the purpose of . . . assessing [BAC].”143  There is em-
pirical knowledge about an individual’s BAC that was not available at the 
time Schmerber was decided.144  Combined with statistics on the amount of 
time it takes for a police officer to obtain a warrant, knowledge on how 
quickly an individual’s BAC dissipates would provide context to an otherwise 
highly theoretical consideration of “exigent circumstances.”  First, this Part 
analyzes these factors.  Then, it examines the reliability of alternative meth-
ods of extrapolating an individual’s BAC retroactively from a delayed blood 
draw. 
1.  Dissipation Rate of Alcohol from the Bloodstream 
The dissipation rate of alcohol determines how quickly an individual’s 
body will spontaneously destroy BAC evidence and, therefore, sheds light on 
whether the dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream should by itself consti-
tute a “special fact” invoking the “exigent circumstances” exception permit-
ting a warrantless and nonconsensual blood draw.  If the statistics show that 
alcohol dissipates quickly from the average person’s bloodstream, there is 
more support for the conclusion that the dissipation of an individual’s BAC 
  
 140. McNeely, 358 S.W. at 74 (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 
770 (1966)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 141. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 156 P.3d at 780. 
 142. Correll, supra note 6, at 383. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
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should by itself constitute a “special fact” invoking the “exigent circum-
stances” exception.  If the statistics show that alcohol dissipates slowly from 
the average person’s bloodstream, there is more support for the opposite con-
clusion.    
Before analyzing how quickly alcohol dissipates from the bloodstream, 
it is necessary to define how BAC is calculated.145  BAC is commonly ex-
pressed as the milligrams of alcohol per deciliter of blood.146  Where there are 
100 milligrams of alcohol per deciliter of blood, .10% of the bloodstream 
contains alcohol and the BAC is .10.147  It follows that where there are 80 
milligrams of alcohol per every deciliter of blood, .08% of the bloodstream 
consists of alcohol and the BAC is .08.148  A .08 BAC represents the thresh-
old in which a person is legally intoxicated and therefore cannot drive.149  Put 
algebraically, BAC can be calculated with a two-step process.150  First, it is 
necessary to determine the milligrams of alcohol per deciliter of blood: (mil-
ligrams of alcohol present / deciliters of blood) = milligrams of alcohol per 
deciliter of blood.151  Then, this must be converted to BAC: (milligrams of 
alcohol per deciliter of blood / 1,000) = BAC.152 
A number of factors affect how much alcohol will reach the blood-
stream, and how quickly the alcohol will dissipate from the bloodstream 
thereafter.153  These rates vary according to many characteristics of a person, 
including, but not limited to, sex, weight, body fat, amount of body water, 
and drinking habits.154  These rates are also affected by the presence of cer-
tain substances in an individual’s system, including, but not limited to, food, 
  
 145. See Jerry R. Balentine, Alcohol Intoxication, E-MED. HEALTH, 
http://www.emedicinehealth.com/alcohol_intoxication/page3_em.htm (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2012) (explaining how BAC is commonly calculated). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. See id.  It is important to note here that a .08 BAC means that .08% of the 
bloodstream contains alcohol.  See id.  A .08 BAC should not be construed to mean 
that .8% or 8% of the bloodstream contains alcohol.   
 149. The introduction to this note explains that Congress has encouraged states to 
set their threshold for DWI offenses to a .08 BAC by offering federal subsidies to 
those states that did so, which in practical effect mandated that states set their thresh-
old for DWI offenses to a .08 BAC.  See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 150. See Balentine, supra note 145. 
 151. See id.  
 152. See id.  
 153. See J.B. Saunders & A. Paton, ABC of Alcohol: Alcohol in the Body, 283 
BRIT. MED. J. 1380, 1380 (1981);  Alcohol, MERCK MANUAL FOR HEALTH CARE 
PROFS. (July 2008), http://www.merck.com/mmpe/sec15/ch198/ch198g.html; Nach-
man Brautbar, Principles and Pitfalls in Alcohol Toxicity, NACHMAN BRAUTBAR 
M.D., http://www.environmentaldiseases.com/article-alcohol-toxicity.html (last vis-
ited Nov. 12, 2012). 
 154. See Saunders & Paton, supra note 153, at 1380. 
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non-alcoholic drinks, and drugs affecting metabolism.155  Although variations 
exist, “the following standards represent the generally accepted premises” to 
determine how much alcohol will reach the bloodstream, and how quickly the 
alcohol will dissipate from the bloodstream thereafter.156 
One serving of alcohol is defined as a single 12-ounce beer, a 6-ounce 
glass of wine, or a 1.5-ounce jigger of distilled liquor.157  These servings con-
tain approximately 10 to 15 grams of alcohol.158  However, not all of the al-
cohol that is consumed will reach the bloodstream because alcohol is distrib-
uted evenly throughout a person’s body water.159  Most body tissues are ex-
posed to the same amount of alcohol as the bloodstream.160  The liver is the 
only exception, as it is exposed to a greater amount of alcohol.161  The aver-
age adult has 400 deciliters of body water,162 of which 50 deciliters are 
blood.163  For an average person, then, a little less than 1/8 of the alcohol he 
or she consumes will reach the bloodstream.  For the purposes of calculating 
BAC and accounting for the liver’s increased exposure to alcohol, it is as-
sumed that approximately 1/9 of the alcohol consumed will reach the blood-
stream.  
For an average person on an empty stomach, alcohol will reach maxi-
mum concentration in the bloodstream approximately 1 hour after consump-
tion.164  However, where other factors are present that affect this rate,165 alco-
hol will reach maximum concentration in the bloodstream between 30 to 90 
minutes after consumption.166  After the alcohol reaches maximum concentra-
tion, an average person on an empty stomach eliminates approximately 15 
milligrams of alcohol per deciliter of blood every hour.167  The alcohol con-
tinues to dissipate at this linear rate until it has been completely eliminated 
from the system.168  However, where other factors are present that affect this 
  
 155. See id. 
 156. Correll, supra note 6, at 389-90; see also infra notes 158-64. 
 157. Correll, supra note 6, at 389-90; Alcohol, supra note 153. 
 158. Correll, supra note 6, at 390; Alcohol, supra note 153. 
 159. Alex Paton, ABC of Alcohol: Alcohol in the Body, 330 BRIT. MED. J. 85, 85 
(2005). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See Ken Kashubara, About Water Weight, E-HOW, 
http://www.ehow.com/about_4570468_water-weight.html (last visited Nov. 12, 
2012). 
 163. See Anne Marie Helmenstine, What Is the Volume & Chemical Composition 
of Blood?, CHEMISTRY, http://chemistry.about.com/cs/5/f/blbloodcomp.htm (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2012).   
 164. Paton, supra note 159, at 86. 
 165. See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.   
 166. See Alcohol, supra note 153. 
 167. Correll, supra note 6, at 390 (citing Paton, supra note 159, at 86). 
 168. See Paton, supra note 159, at Figure 5. 
19
Stockmann: Stockmann: Drawing on the Constitution
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
File: StockmannPaginated.docx Created on:  10/21/13 10:30 PM Last Printed: 11/3/13 11:12 PM 
370 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78 
 
rate,169 the dissipation rate will be different.170  In such a situation, the alcohol 
continues to dissipate at a different linear rate until it has completely elimi-
nated from the system.171 
If alcohol is consumed at high concentrations, such as consuming 48 
grams which is approximately 4-5 servings, of alcohol in one sitting, the ab-
sorption and dissipation rates are not linear.172  Once the alcohol has reached 
maximum concentration, it will remain at maximum concentration for some 
period of time.173  The exact amount of time varies according a number of 
factors.174  After this period of time, the alcohol will initially dissipate at that 
individual’s average dissipation rate.175  However, the alcohol will not con-
tinue to dissipate at this rate until it is completely eliminated from the blood-
stream.176  Instead, this rate will get slower as alcohol continues to dissipate, 
therefore the alcohol will remain in the blood longer than it normally 
would.177  The exact dissipation rate at any time subsequent to the initial dis-
sipation varies according to a number of factors.178 
To clarify, suppose “Average Man” consumes two shots of 1.5-ounce 
liquor, each of which contain 15 grams of alcohol, at 9 p.m.179  “Average 
Man” has consumed 30 grams of alcohol, which is equivalent to 30,000 mil-
ligrams of alcohol.  Of these 30,000 milligrams of alcohol, approximately 
3,333 milligrams reach “Average Man’s” bloodstream.180  This means that 
approximately 1 hour later, at 10 p.m., these 3,333 milligrams of alcohol will 
  
 169. See supra 153-55 and accompanying text. 
 170. Paton, supra note 159, at 86. 
 171. See id. at Figure 5. 
 172. Id. at Figure 4.  For example, this would be the situation if an individual 
consumed six 1.5-ounce shots of liquor in one sitting.  Id. 
 173. See id. 
 174. Id. at 86.  The factors are those previously listed.  See supra notes 153-55 
and accompanying text. 
 175. Paton, supra note 159, at 86.  Again, an average person on an empty stomach 
eliminates approximately 15 milligrams of alcohol per deciliter of blood every hour.  
Correll, supra note 6, at 390 (citing Paton, supra note 159, at 86). 
 176. Paton, supra note 159, at Figure 4. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 86.  The factors are those previously listed.  See supra notes 153-55 
and accompanying text. 
 179. For the purpose of this hypothetical, assume “Average Man” is the average 
person upon which these generally accepted premises are based.  It is important to 
note at the beginning of this hypothetical that “Average Man’s” BAC may appear 
higher than one would think.  This is mainly because these premises assume that the 
average person is drinking on an empty stomach, and also that the alcohol is con-
sumed during one sitting rather than over a given period of time.  
 180. To calculate this, we are assuming only 1/9 of the alcohol will reach the 
bloodstream.  See supra notes 158-64 and accompanying text.  The math would look 
like this: 30,000 (milligrams of alcohol consumed) x 1/9 (assumption of how much 
blood reaches the bloodstream) = 3,333 milligrams of alcohol in the bloodstream.  
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reach maximum concentration in “Average Man’s” bloodstream.181  At 10 
p.m. “Average Man” will have a BAC of about .06.182  Approximately two 
hours after 10 p.m., however, 1,500 milligrams of the alcohol will be elimi-
nated from “Average Man’s” bloodstream and “Average Man” will only have 
1,833 milligrams of alcohol remaining in his bloodstream.183  At midnight, 
“Average Man” will have a BAC of about .03.184  Approximately two hours 
after midnight, at 2 a.m., 1,500 more milligrams of alcohol will be eliminated 
from “Average Man’s” blood.185   
In relation to the issue addressed in this Note, suppose “Average Man” 
consumes 3 beers at 11 p.m., all of which were 12 ounces and contained 15 
grams of alcohol.186  At midnight, “Average Man” is driving to a friend’s 
house and is pulled over by a police officer.  The police officer realizes that 
“Average Man” is slurring his speech and smells like alcohol, so he asks 
“Average Man” to consent to a blood test.  “Average Man” refuses consent, 
so the police officer obtains a warrant and conducts a blood draw on “Aver-
age Man” at 2 a.m.  “Average Man” consumed 45,000 milligrams of alcohol 
at 11 p.m.  Of these 45,000 milligrams of alcohol, approximately 5,000 milli-
grams will reach “Average Man’s” bloodstream.187  Approximately one hour 
  
 181. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 182. To calculate this BAC, it is necessary to engage into the 2-step process pre-
viously explained.  See supra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.  First, it is neces-
sary to determine the milligrams of alcohol per deciliter of blood: 3,333 (milligrams 
of alcohol in the blood) / 50 (deciliters of blood) = 66.67.  Then, it is necessary to 
determine the BAC: 66.67 / 1,000 = .067 BAC. 
 183. This Note previously explained that after alcohol reaches maximum concen-
tration, someone like “Average Man” would eliminate approximately fifteen milli-
grams of alcohol per deciliter of blood every hour.  See supra note 167 and accompa-
nying text.  “Average Man” has fifty deciliters of blood.  See supra note 163 and 
accompanying text.  Therefore, the math would look like this: 3,333 (milligrams of 
alcohol in the blood) – (15 (milligrams that dissipate) x 50 (per deciliter) x 2 (hours 
passed) = 1,500) = 1,833. 
 184. The result is obtained from the BAC formula previously provided.  See supra 
notes 145-52 and accompanying text.  First, the milligrams of alcohol per deciliter: 
1,833 (milligrams of alcohol present) / 50 (deciliters of blood) = 36.66.  Next, the 
BAC: 36.67 (milligrams of alcohol present) / 1,000 = .036 BAC. 
 185. This analysis is the same as previously explained.  See supra notes 157-63 
and accompanying text. 
 186. Again, assume “Average Man” is the average person upon which these gen-
erally accepted premises are based.  It is important to note at the beginning of this 
hypothetical that “Average Man’s” BAC may appear higher than one would think.  
This is mainly because these premises assume that the average person is drinking on 
an empty stomach, and also that the alcohol is consumed during one sitting rather than 
over a given period of time.  
 187. To calculate this, we are assuming only 1/9 of the alcohol will reach the 
bloodstream.  See supra notes 157-63 and accompanying text.  The math would look 
like this: 45,000 (milligrams of alcohol consumed) x 1/9 (assumption of how much 
blood reaches the bloodstream) = 5,000.  
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later, at midnight, those 5,000 milligrams of alcohol will reach maximum 
concentration in the bloodstream.188  When “Average Man” was pulled over 
at midnight, “Average Man’s” BAC was .10.189  When the blood draw was 
obtained, however, 1,500 milligrams of alcohol had already been eliminated 
from “Average Man’s” bloodstream and there were only 3,500 milligrams of 
alcohol remaining.190  When the blood draw was conducted on “Average 
Man” at 2 a.m., “Average Man’s” BAC was .070.191  Thus, while “Average 
Man” was above the legal limit when he was pulled over, by the time of the 
blood draw he was not considered legally intoxicated.192 
Though these statistics may vary depending on the individual, a few 
conclusions are clear.  First, alcohol typically begins to dissipate one hour 
after it is consumed.193  Second, once alcohol begins to dissipate, an individ-
ual’s BAC decreases rapidly such that any delay in taking a blood draw could 
destroy evidence.194  With this in mind, these statistics clearly favor the inter-
pretation of Schmerber that states that the rapid dissipation of an individual’s 
BAC should by itself constitute a “special fact” invoking the “exigent cir-
cumstances” exception permitting a warrantless and nonconsensual blood 
draw on an alleged drunk driver.195  However, before conclusively deciding 
this, it is necessary to analyze whether the average time it takes for a police 
officer to obtain a warrant would normally create a delay that would threaten 
  
 188. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 189. To calculate this BAC, it is necessary to engage in the two-step process pre-
viously explained.  See supra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.  First, it is neces-
sary to determine the milligrams of alcohol per deciliter of blood: 5,000 (milligrams 
of alcohol in the blood) / 50 (deciliters of blood) = 100.  Then, it is necessary to de-
termine the BAC: 100/1,000 = .10 BAC. 
 190. This note previously explained that after alcohol reaches maximum concen-
tration, someone like “Average Man” would eliminate approximately fifteen milli-
grams of alcohol per deciliter of blood every hour.  See supra note 167 and accompa-
nying text.  “Average Man” has fifty deciliters of blood.  See supra note 163 and 
accompanying text.  Therefore, the math would look like this: 5,000 (milligrams of 
alcohol in the blood) – (15 (milligrams that dissipate) x 50 (per deciliter of blood) x 2 
(hours passed) = 1,500) = 3,500. 
 191. To calculate this BAC, it is necessary to engage in the two-step process pre-
viously explained.  See supra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.  First, it is neces-
sary to determine the milligrams of alcohol per deciliter of blood: 3,500 (milligrams 
of alcohol in the blood) / 50 (deciliters of blood) = 70.  Then, it is necessary to deter-
mine the BAC: 70 / 1,000 = .07. 
 192. The threshold for DWI offenses in Missouri is .08 BAC.  MO. REV. STAT. § 
577.010 (Supp. 2011). 
 193. Paton, supra note 159, at 86. 
 194. See id.  Indeed, the destruction of at least some evidence is inevitable; even if 
a driver remains above the legal limit at the time of a blood draw, some alcohol will 
have dissipated between the first encounter with law enforcement and the subsequent 
blood draw. 
 195. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.   
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the material destruction of BAC evidence by these alcohol absorption and 
dissipation rates. 
2.  Time to Obtain a Warrant 
The average time it takes a police officer to obtain a warrant will affect 
whether the average dissipation rate of an individual’s BAC should by itself 
constitute a “special fact” invoking the “exigent circumstances” exception 
permitting a warrantless and nonconsensual blood draw.  If the statistics show 
that the time it takes to obtain a warrant is so long that the average dissipation 
rate of an individual’s BAC threatens the material destruction of evidence, 
there is more support for conclusion that this fact by itself should constitute a 
“special fact” invoking the “exigent circumstances” exception permitting a 
warrantless and nonconsensual blood draw on an alleged drunk driver.  If the 
statistics show that a warrant may be obtained without the dissipation rate of 
an individual’s BAC threatening the destruction of much evidence, there is 
more support for the alternative interpretation of Schmerber.  
In Missouri, as is likely true in most states, the time it takes to obtain a 
warrant to conduct a blood draw on an alleged drunk driver varies from place 
to place.196  In general, police officers around Missouri have indicated that 
such a warrant can seemingly always be obtained within two to four hours 
from the time the alleged drunk driving occurred.197  More specifically, offi-
cers from less populous area of Missouri claimed that the average time to 
obtain such a warrant is usually around one hour.198  On the other hand, po-
lice officers from the larger cities in Missouri estimated that the average time 
to obtain this warrant ranges from about two hours to four hours.199   
The average amount of time it takes a police officer in Missouri to ob-
tain a warrant for a blood draw in DWI cases is similar to the amount of time 
  
 196. To get estimates on how long it takes a police officer in Missouri to obtain a 
warrant for a blood draw on an alleged drunk driver, I interviewed police officers 
from the following areas: Saint Louis, Kansas City, Columbia, Cape Girardeau, and 
Springfield.   Telephone Interview with Detective Anderson, Detective, Kansas City 
Police Department (Feb. 3, 2012) [hereinafter Anderson]; Telephone Interview with 
Tom Murphy, Police Officer, Saint Louis County Police Department (Feb. 3, 2012) 
[hereinafter Murphy]; Telephone Interview with Kevin Orr, Police Officer, Cape 
Girardeau Police Department (Feb. 3, 2012) [hereinafter Orr]; Telephone Interview 
with Scott Young, Lieutenant, Columbia Police Department (Feb. 3, 2012) [herinafter 
Young]; Telephone Interview with Anonymous, Police Officer, Springfield Police 
Department (Feb. 5, 2012) [hereinafter Anonymous]. 
 197. Anderson, supra note 196; Murphy, supra note 196; Orr, supra note 196; 
Young, supra note 196; Anonymous, supra note 196. 
 198. Orr, supra note 196; Young, supra note 196; Anonymous, supra note 196. 
The “less populous” areas included Columbia, Cape Girardeau, and Springfield. 
 199. Anderson, supra note 196; Murphy, supra note 196. The “larger cities” in-
cluded Saint Louis and Kansas City.   
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it takes police officers in other states to obtain such a warrant.  In the 1980s, it 
took approximately four hours to obtain this type of warrant in most states.200  
Today, however, a police officer can obtain such a warrant much more 
quickly because most states now permit warrants to be obtained over the tele-
phone or by fax machine.201  Although more efficient methods of communi-
cation are now available to obtain a warrant, it still usually takes a police 
officer in any given state approximately one to two hours to obtain this war-
rant.202 
Reviewing the statistics on alcohol absorption and dissipation rates, 
along with the average time it takes a Missouri police officer to obtain a war-
rant for a blood draw in a DWI case, one conclusion becomes clear.  Because 
an individual’s BAC typically begins to dissipate rapidly approximately one 
hour after drinking,203 and because it generally takes two to four hours to 
obtain a warrant of the type at issue, an alleged drunk driver’s BAC will typi-
cally begin to dissipate rapidly before a police officer may obtain a warrant.  
Even after obtaining such a warrant, there will be additional time lost, and 
thus more time for the driver’s BAC to dissipate, when the police officer must 
take the suspect to the proper facility to have blood drawn.  This information 
clearly favors the interpretation of Schmerber that holds that the rapid dissi-
pation of an individual’s BAC by itself is a “special fact” invoking the “exi-
gent circumstances” exception.204  However, before deciding this issue con-
clusively, it is necessary to analyze whether retrograde extrapolation is a vi-
able alternative to retroactively determine an individual’s BAC after alcohol 
has dissipated from the bloodstream. 
3.  Reliability of Retrograde Extrapolation 
Retrograde extrapolation is the process by which a medical or scientific 
expert assesses an individual’s BAC based on blood tests conducted hours 
after alcohol has dissipated partially, but not completely, from the blood-
stream.205  While some believe that modern technology ensures the reliability 
of retrograde extrapolation, courts diverge greatly as to the admissibility of 
  
 200. Oversight into the Administration of State and Local Court Adjudication of 
Driving While Intoxicated: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 93 (1982) (statement of Dr. Alasdair, Medical Director, 
Maryland Institute for Emergency Medical Systems). 
 201. E. John Wherry, Jr., DWI Blood Alcohol Testing: Responding to a Proposal 
Compelling Medical Personnel to Withdraw Blood, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 655, 667 
(1994).   
 202. Affidavit of Lieutenant Greg Zarotney, Platte v. Thomas Twp., 504 F. Supp. 
2d 227 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (No. 1:05-CV-10200), 2006 WL 1967870, at *3. 
 203. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 204. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text. 
 205. Wines, supra note 22, at *1. 
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such an estimation of BAC.206  If the methods of retrograde extrapolation are 
reliable, there is more support for the conclusion that more “special facts” 
beyond the rapid dissipation of an individual’s BAC are necessary to qualify 
as an “exigent circumstance.”  If these methods are not reliable, there is more 
support for the opposite conclusion.  
Proponents of using retrograde extrapolation in court ensure its reliabil-
ity as the “principles underlying the procedure are clearly scientifically rec-
ognized.”207  However, only a few courts have ruled that evidence of an indi-
vidual’s BAC determined by retrograde extrapolation may be admitted.208  
Even these courts have admitted such evidence only if “certain factors are 
known [when conducting the retrograde extrapolation analysis], such as the 
length of the drinking spree, the time of the last drink, and the person’s 
weight.”209  Some courts also condition the admissibility of such evidence on 
the “expert’s ability to apply the science and explain it with clarity to the 
court.”210  While other courts have concluded that evidence of an individual’s 
BAC determined by retrograde extrapolation may be admitted, these courts 
seem to be reluctant to conclude that retrograde extrapolation is per se reli-
able.  
Many medical and scientific experts have been quick to criticize retro-
grade extrapolation, stating that it contains many technical inaccuracies.211  
These critics emphasize that “the potential rate of error increases as time 
elapses from the event in question and the time the test is performed.”212  
Also, they note that retrograde extrapolation “fail[s] to consider the individ-
ual’s specific elimination rate.”213  To support this proposition, these critics 
emphasize the large number of factors that affect a person’s rate of alcohol 
absorption and dissipation.214   
Courts would be sensible to deem retrograde extrapolation unreliable, 
and therefore not admit evidence of an individual’s BAC when it is deter-
mined by such a method.  First, the fact that the potential error rate increases 
as time elapses is alarming.  This fact, coupled with the rapid dissipation of 
alcohol from the bloodstream and the time it takes for a police officer to ob-
tain a warrant, means that using retrograde extrapolation in DWI cases will 
  
 206. Id. (“[T]here is great diversity of opinions, from completely rejecting the use 
of retrograde extrapolation, to allowing it with limitation, to allowing it unfettered”). 
 207. J. Nicholas Bostic, Alcohol-Related Offenses: Retrograde Extrapolation 
After Wager, 79 MICH. BAR J., June 2000, at 668, 671. 
 208. Wines, supra note 22, at *2. 
 209. Mata v. State, 46 S.W.3d 902, 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). 
 210. Id. at 916. 
 211. Keller, supra note 2, at 124-25. 
 212. Id. at 126. 
 213. Id. at 125. 
 214. Id. at 128.  The many factors which affect the rate of alcohol absorption and 
dissipation were discussed previously.  See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying 
text. 
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have a large potential rate of error.  Second, retrograde extrapolation can 
make assumptions about the average person, yet these assumptions will not 
apply to every specific individual.  Because of the large number of factors 
that affect an individual’s rate of alcohol absorption and dissipation,215 retro-
grade extrapolation is inherently unreliable.  While experts may agree that 
retrograde extrapolation may be reliable, many disagree as to what factors 
must be considered to ensure reliability in every case.216  Thus, until a more 
reliable method of retrograde extrapolation exists, Schmerber should be inter-
preted as holding that the rapid dissipation of an individual’s BAC by itself 
constitutes a “special fact” invoking the “exigent circumstances” exception 
permitting a warrantless and nonconsensual blood draw on an alleged drunk 
driver. 
4.  Rapid Dissipation of BAC by Itself is an Exigent Circumstance 
The rapid dissipation of an individual’s BAC is by itself a straightfor-
ward “special fact” qualifying as an “exigent circumstance” permitting a war-
rantless and nonconsensual blood draw on an alleged drunk driver.  The em-
pirical data objectively shows that alcohol typically begins to dissipate one 
hour after consumption,217 it takes about two to four hours for a police officer 
to obtain the type of warrant at issue,218 and retrograde extrapolation is not 
yet a viable alternative to retroactively assess an individual’s BAC.219  Fur-
thermore, it is the driver’s natural rate of alcohol dissipation, not the action of 
a police officer, that threatens the destruction of evidence.  Therefore, courts 
should interpret Schmerber as holding that the rapid dissipation of alcohol 
from the bloodstream without more creates a “special fact” invoking the 
“exigent circumstances” exception permitting a warrantless and nonconsen-
sual blood draw on an alleged drunk driver. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of Missouri’s decision in McNeely reflected one of 
two divergent interpretations of Schmerber.  The court justified its analysis by 
interpreting the text of Schmerber, and stating the policy that supports its 
interpretation.  However, upon further consideration of Schmerber, it be-
comes clear that neither its text nor the policy behind its decision clearly fa-
vors either Missouri’s interpretation or the opposite conclusion.  For this rea-
son, it is vital for courts to find new ways to justify their interpretation of this 
case.  With the advances in modern technology, empirical data now exists 
  
 215. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text. 
 216. Keller, supra note 2, at 127. 
 217. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 218. See supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
 219. See supra notes 205-16 and accompanying text. 
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that could help insulate a court’s interpretation of Schmerber from reversal 
and help the court strike the proper balance of crime control and privacy pro-
tection.  Upon a thorough analysis of the applicable statistics, the empirical 
data clearly indicates that the proper interpretation of Schmerber is the one 
that states that the rapid dissipation of an individual’s BAC by itself is suffi-
cient to constitute a “special fact” invoking the “exigent circumstances” ex-
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